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Introduction
[E]ach gift is part of a system of reciprocity in which the honours of 
giver and recipient are engaged. It is a total system in that every item of 
status or of spiritual or material possession is implicated for everyone 
in the whole community. The system is quite simple: just the rule that 
every gift has to be returned in some specified way sets up a perceptual 
cycle of exchanges within and between generations. In some cases the 
specified return is of equal value, producing a stable system of statuses; 
in others it must exceed the value of the earlier gift, producing an es-
calating contest of honour. The whole society can be described by the 
catalogue of transfers that map all the obligations between its members. 
The cycling gift system is the society.
(Douglas 1990, viii–ix)
The quote above by Mary Douglas reflects the ethos of the present chapter, 
in which I explore the essence of reciprocity from the viewpoint of well- 
being. Let me, however, begin by recollecting a personal memory that led 
me to consider the theme. A quarter of a century ago, I visited the School for 
Advanced Urban Studies, which operates under the auspices of the Univer-
sity of Bristol. At the end of the week, the researchers had the habit of going 
down to the pub. The evening proceeded in such a way that one would offer 
a round to everyone, and then it would be the turn of the next. There were 
around ten of us, and I became restless when I thought about when it would 
be my turn. Why on earth should I offer drinks to such a large group of peo-
ple, most of whom I hardly knew? Perhaps I would buy a round next Friday 
or the Friday after. Or should I offer to buy it now to avoid being labelled a 
freeloader and risk losing face?
I decided to raise the topic of buying rounds, and the rules of the game 
were explained to me. Naturally, no record was kept of who had bought 
what; you simply trusted that everyone would commit, more or less, to the 
principle of reciprocity. If one Friday night did turn out to be expensive, 
1 Reciprocity and well-being
Antti Karisto
12 Antti Karisto
you got to drink for free on many following Fridays, and in the long run, 
everything would work out fair and square. As a temporary guest, I wasn’t 
expected to buy a round, but these urban sociologists in the pub were ex-
tremely surprised at my description of Finnish pub culture, where everyone 
buys their own drinks, or, if not, they settle up during the same night.
My pub experience gave me food for thought; it forced me to ponder 
 offering and reciprocity. Offering can be an empty word; reciprocity can 
be spurious. If accounts are immediately settled, then the bother of paying 
is just passed from one person to another, in turn. With mechanical reci-
procity, the boozing continues, but the kind of reciprocity that really sweet-
ens life seems to require something else: disinterested willingness to give, 
spontaneous broad-mindedness, tactful understanding of the situation and 
appreciation of the nature of the good life.
In this chapter, I investigate reciprocity and its importance in the creation 
of well-being. I begin by making a few observations about cultural variation 
in everyday social intercourse and then move on to the level of concepts. 
If reciprocity is a difficult notion open to many interpretations, then so is 
well-being. A confusing factor is that there are several competing discourses 
on well-being, and the significance of reciprocity varies between them. I will 
give particular thought to well-being in human relationships as reciprocity 
is connected to them almost by definition. I will also examine the kind of 
‘general reciprocity’ that occurs in social policy and social work. Finally, I 
investigate reciprocity in old age and in intergenerational relations. When 
we are old, we are particularly dependent on one another, and the sustain-
ability of our well-being requires a ‘generationally intelligent’ social policy.
Culturally defined forms of reciprocity
As a Finn, I am accustomed to the exchange of words in everyday comings 
and goings being rather terse. In his novel, Hannu Raittila presents this in 
an indisputable way:
In speech in foreign languages a Finn is always disturbed by the fact that 
sentences have all kinds of unnecessary phrases and politeness forms. 
They make the language difficult and awkward to speak and obscure its 
meaning. In Finnish, the matter is said in the simplest and most unam-
biguous way possible, and then we wait to see what the other replies. If 
there is nothing to say, we are silent.
(Raittila 2001, p. 40)
We are often silent. Linguists have characterised reticence and ‘minimal po-
liteness’ as being typical of Finns. We react to open rudeness, but we do not 
expect language to be particularly polite (e.g. jaakkola 2008, pp. 113–115). 
Does Finland suffer from a particular deficit of politeness and respect of 
the kind that Richard Sennett (2003) considers to be a unifying feature of 
modern societies? Finns are certainly capable of saying ‘thank you’, but one 
Reciprocity and well-being 13
symptom of the paucity of explicitly polite reciprocity that is embedded in 
the Finnish language or mind is our lack of an equivalent for the useful word 
‘please’. Well, of course, we have the phrasal equivalents ole hyvä and olkaa 
hyvä (literally ‘be good’), but using them is already something of an effort: 
You need to use two words and choose between the formal and informal 
form of address. Perhaps for this reason, these words are used far less than 
quickly delivered words in many other languages (Karisto 2010, pp. 74–77). 
In Finnish, kiitos (‘thank you’) is like a full stop. You can reply to it with 
eipä kestä (‘no problem’) or the more ceremonious kiitos on minun puolellani 
(‘my pleasure’; literally, ‘the gratitude is on my side’), but those phrases have 
the same tone: That’s enough thanking! Obligatory phrases are recited, but 
reciprocity is not expected to continue over and above this point.
Finland is considered a low context culture in which people typically 
attempt to produce so-called first-level descriptions. Things are said ‘the 
way they are’; the relationship between speech and its subject is considered 
unambiguous. This contrasts with second-level descriptions or high context 
cultures in which speech does not refer so much to reality as to other speech 
concerning that reality (Daun 1989, Baudrillard 1991, see Alapuro 1997, 
pp. 184–186).
The division between low or high contexts or first and second levels is, of 
course, a generalising typology that may exaggerate cultural differences. 
There is no reason to consider a paucity of reciprocity to be an essential 
characteristic of Finnish culture or brand Finnish manners as shoddier or 
coarser than those of other cultures. While in other cultures, politeness is 
cultivated more intensely, social interaction is not necessarily more warm-
hearted. It is unlikely that Brits are always as thoroughly broad-minded and 
generous as they implied in that Bristol pub. And perhaps it is an example of 
‘orientalism’ (Said 2011) to think that reciprocity is always the spice of life in 
Eastern cultures. For example, benevolence and sympathy (amae) are said 
to be at the centre of the japanese way of life. Gifts are given in many situ-
ations, for instance, when a colleague’s daughter gets married, irrespective 
of whether one personally knows the individual concerned or not. A gift is 
always followed by a reciprocal gift, but the exchange of gifts is normatively 
regulated and carefully apportioned. A reciprocal gift cannot be too modest 
or too extravagant; in some situations, it must be a defined fraction of the 
value of the gift received. This even obliges people to keep a written record 
of the gifts they have received and discover their monetary value (Davies 
and Ikeno 2002, pp. 238–239). But doesn’t norm-driven, carefully calculated 
reciprocity feel more like an obligation than real reciprocity (see also Becker 
1986, pp. 73–74)?
Forms of reciprocity are culturally specific, and it is difficult to place them 
in rank order. Forms of reciprocity are also malleable. In recent years, there 
has been a greater abundance of Finnish phrases and expressions; linguistic 
reciprocity has clearly become richer. The new generation of service sector 
workers draws its influences from practices abroad, and presumably people 
in Finnish pubs also behave differently from my generation in its youth.
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Organic reciprocity, not a mechanistic exchange
The kind of reciprocity that boosts well-being does not need to be of the ex-
pressive, effusive kind; rather, it can also be realised in a restrained Finnish 
way, without melodrama. Nonetheless, in some way, it must be flexible and 
organic. Reciprocity includes giving, even if we do not immediately receive 
something in return. Reciprocity can only be realised over the course of 
time, and it does not always need to occur. It can be more of a disposition: 
a general willingness to do good for others. For example, the core of friend-
ship is just this willingness. We have friends, so we can turn to them, even if 
we don’t actually turn to them, and although they cannot always help. The 
modern understanding of friendship, in contrast, is freedom from binding 
obligations (Pahl 2000, p. 37). Hospitality is another model for reciprocity 
and searching for a good life. For example, the sharing of meals is meant 
to be continual. The pattern ‘give, receive, give in return…’ identifies an 
open-ended process in which some imbalance is always present (Boisvert 
and Heldke 2016, p. 51).
In reciprocity that occurs in social interaction, there must be space for 
 situational sensitivity (Naukkarinen 2011). Spontaneity and surprise are 
good – there is little enjoyment in getting something one was already cer-
tain of receiving. It feels much better to receive something unexpectedly and 
from an unlikely source.
Nonetheless, an entirely predictable, mechanistic exchange, or what 
Serge-Christophe Kolm (2000a, p. 14) terms ‘self-sustained sequential ex-
change’, also has its uses. It is better that norms oblige us to perform friendly 
gestures rather than entice us to engage in misanthropy. Even mechanical 
or superficial reciprocity maintains a sense of community, and neglecting it 
can be fatal in the same way that open arrogance is. However, mechanical 
reciprocity is hardly a bottomless wellspring of well-being, and neither is 
simply refraining from impoliteness. Well-being is something more than a 
lack of problems and grievances or their successful regulation – contrary 
to common thinking in social policy and social work, where well-being and 
welfare are often conflated. In Finnish, there is also confusion due to the fact 
that the word hyvinvointi is used to describe the good life of an individual 
(well-being), the good produced by the welfare state (welfare) and any form 
of indulgent and momentary gratification (wellness). Even actual well-being 
has many forms, and the Finnish sociologist Erik Allardt (1976), for exam-
ple, divides it into three broad dimensions: Having, Loving and Being.
The many forms of well-being
Not all forms of reciprocity are good as reciprocity can also involve revenge 
for ill treatment. However, my focus here is on reciprocity that is beneficial 
in one way or other – but beneficial for what? Well-being, like reciprocity, 
is a multifaceted and slippery concept. Although the nature of the good life 
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has been pondered for millennia and the multiplicity of well-being has often 
been emphasised, in public discourse, it is basically understood as Having, 
i.e. the material goods that a person possesses. In publicity, well-being is 
embedded in the economy. It is believed that well-being is produced when 
the economy is left to function free from interference. The well-being of the 
economy is an issue of absolute primacy because it is considered to trickle 
down to create individual well-being.
Even if the economic approach to well-being has become dominant, it is 
by no means the only perspective. There are several competing discourses 
on well-being, and the significance of reciprocity varies between them. 
For promoters of health, well-being, above all, means a healthy and well- 
functioning body. In social policy, it is the good produced by the welfare 
state, the regulation of poverty and other problems – at bottom, security. 
From an ecological perspective, sustainability is the crucial precondition of 
well- being. It may mean transcendental or aesthetic peak experiences and 
so on. Well-being is much discussed, but one person understands it one way 
and the next in a different way. Politicians and other actors are quick to ap-
peal to well-being because it is the magic word that also seems to legitimise 
the pursuit of their particular interests (Karisto 2010, pp. 15–19).
Reciprocity has been highly prominent in economic notions of well- 
being (e.g. Gérard-Varet et al. 2000, Gintis 2000a, 2000b). In fact, it has 
been  economists who have developed the formal theory of reciprocity – 
game  theory – the furthest. In particular, the theme of reciprocity has been 
 cultivated in discussions on alternatives to a pure market economy: caring 
economy, social enterprises and corporate social responsibility, women’s 
banks and microcredit and finance, fair trade practices and time banking, 
in which the transfer of services does not involve the exchange of money but 
the exchange of time and services provided for others (Bruni 2008,  Koskiaho 
2014, Hirvilammi 2015).
Nevertheless, reciprocity has been even more widely discussed in the 
 social sciences, psychology, anthropology and moral philosophy. In these 
disciplines, reciprocity and economic exchange are considered two differ-
ent, even mutually exclusive, principles of exchange (Polanyi 2001, p. 47, 
 Kujala and Danielsbacka 2015, pp. 20–21 and 39–43). For example, the 
Swedish sociologist Sten johansson has warned about mixing the rules of 
private and economic life, terming it ‘prostitution’, the confusing of political 
and economic spheres ‘corruption’ and the intermingling of political and 
private life ‘nepotism’ (johansson 1979, pp. 101–103). According to Niklas 
Luhmann, social subsystems – the economy, politics, the welfare state, sci-
ence, art, the media and others – are ‘autopoietic’, i.e. self-referential. There 
is interaction between them, but each has its own way of communicating, its 
own ‘medium’ and its own ‘code’ (jalava and Kangas 2013). Things turn out 
badly if the medium of one subsystem becomes dominant in the other sub-
systems, with corruption and prostitution being among the consequences 
when ‘money talks’.
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Loving, of course, is closer to reciprocity than the other dimensions of 
well-being distinguished by Allardt (1976). Some level of reciprocity is an 
absolute precondition for well-being based on human relations. The kind of 
partnership or friendship where flows of support and emotion only travel in 
one direction is doomed to fail. The social exchange that occurs among fam-
ily and friends is sometimes considered the only genuine form of reciprocity 
(see Kolm 2000a, p. 28, Bruni 2008, p. xii). Perceived well-being is strongly 
affected by the reciprocity that occurs in social interaction: whether we re-
ceive love and whether we give it, and how we value and treat one another. 
In people’s own interpretations of their well-being, human relationships, 
alongside health, are considered the most significant factors (e.g. Haapola 
et al. 2013, p. 84).
Well-being accumulates in different ways in its different dimensions. 
While hankering after Having, it might feel that well-being grows at the 
 expense of others as there is only a certain amount of material goods to be 
divided at any one time. Well-being built on human relationships, in con-
trast, does not diminish, even if it is given to others. On the contrary, those 
who enjoy the greatest well-being are those for whom goodwill and care for 
the well-being of their nearest and dearest are important (Sortheix 2014).
The various dimensions of well-being relate differently not only to rec-
iprocity but to one another. For example, poor health is a corrosive disad-
vantage (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007) as when health is lost, other forms of 
well-being threaten to vanish. Nonetheless, even if a person is in perfect 
health, this will not necessarily increase her other forms of well-being. In 
contrast, good human relationships and reciprocity are thought to have a 
fertile functioning, i.e. a particular ability to promote other forms of well- 
being (ibid.) and to prevent them from being negatively impacted by various 
kinds of loss. According to Alvin W. Gouldner (1960), reciprocity may also 
initiate social cooperation in the early phases of group consolidation, in 
which others are easily viewed with suspicion, e.g. in interaction between 
immigrants and nationals (Manatschal 2015, p. 243).
Demanding reciprocity
Alongside warm interpersonal emotions, cool intellect is also reciprocal. 
According to the Swedish essayist Horace Engdahl (2013, p. 33), the criteria 
for intelligence lie ‘not in the ability to say profound things but in the ability 
to listen. Intelligence requires two brains, their interplay’.
It is through reciprocity that we find our place in the world (Thompson 
2013, p. 39). Our identities are constructed on the basis of our social inter-
actions with others and our abilities to see the world through others’ eyes. 
‘Through the thou a person becomes I’, wrote Martin Buber (1999, p. 52). 
Similarly, Emmanuel Levinas reminds us that being true to ourselves in-
cludes having a sense of responsibility towards others (see Sennett 1999, 
p. 145).
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Reciprocity is good for both the individual and the community. It 
 reinforces human relationships, increases trust and expands cultural and 
social capital. Nevertheless, it is not an automatic dispenser of happiness. 
Martha Nussbaum (2001, see Bruni 2008, pp. 8–9) has emphasised the enor-
mous significance of friendship, love and other relational goods but has also 
spoken of their fragility. Reciprocity in human relations is never certain. 
On the contrary, well-being connected to human relationships is unsta-
ble, and virtuous circles built on reciprocity are easily broken. According 
to Fransesco Alberoni (1989), nothing beyond the new relationship seems 
to have space in the consciousness of someone who has fallen in love, and 
this source of well-being feels completely inexhaustible. Nevertheless, the 
rapture produced by being in love is generally just momentary ecstasy, and 
the hubris of well-being can be followed by its nemesis. If all goes well, the 
lovers’  tumultuous emotions coalesce into life-affirming prosaic love, but 
for the less fortunate, love evaporates and even becomes its opposite: hate.
The problem with well-being based on Having is that we are never 
 satisfied. A successful purchase only brings a momentary glow; there never 
seems to be enough material well-being. However, a similar kind of ‘pursuit 
of the unattainable’ (Ehrnrooth 1995) also features in reciprocity. Such high 
 demands are placed upon it that we can never entirely realise them.
In the ethics of reciprocity, a famous ideal type is agápe: pure altruistic 
love – i.e. the kind that is ‘patient and kind, does not envy or boast, is not 
arrogant or rude, does not insist on its own way, is not irritable or resent-
ful, and does not rejoice at wrongdoing’. However, this kind of love, which 
‘bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, and endures all things’, 
seems to be above and beyond the kind of reciprocity found in everyday life 
(Bruni 2008, p. 50). ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you’ 
is the golden rule of ethics, but in practice, we never realise this in its en-
tirety. Nonetheless, the mighty precept is necessary. Although (or precisely 
because) we are forced to live our everyday lives in the framework of factual 
necessities, moral guidelines and ‘the principle of hope’ have their purposes 
(e.g. Ehrnrooth 2014). ‘Pursuit of the unattainable’, the attempt to reach be-
yond actual reality, is said to be a characteristic striving of people living in 
the Western world (Ehrnrooth 1995, pp. 34–50), but the golden rule of ethics 
and its variations are certainly recognised in other cultures (e.g. Thompson 
2013, p. 35). This is also proof of the universal value of reciprocity.
In moral philosophy, there are numerous variants of the golden rule. 
Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative obliges us to place ourselves in an-
other person’s shoes and act in such a way that our actions could become 
a  universal law. The face was the central metaphor used by Levinas (1996) 
when writing about encountering another person. When we look another 
person – even a stranger – in the face, we should be ready to take respon-
sibility for that person. Buber’s (1999) comparable ethical imperative was 
Thou, which is entirely different to the It of objectified human relationships. 
According to Buber, we should live in the world of Thou and cherish the 
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I–Thou relationship so that the goal of altruistic reciprocity is realised: ‘be-
tween the I and the Thou there is no striving, no demands nor anticipation’ 
(ibid., p. 34).
Ethical ideals linked to reciprocity are a kind of compass for well-being: 
They give us the direction in which to strive and perhaps also the power 
to do so. Raymond D. Boisvert and Lisa Heldke (2016, pp. 59–65) appoint 
jane Addams, a pioneer of social work, as an ‘inspirational individual’ who 
kept alive the sense of reciprocal dependence. Three ethical principles were 
adopted in Hull House, a neighbourhood settlement for immigrants that 
was founded by Addams: ‘to teach by example, to practice cooperation, and 
to practice social democracy, that is, egalitarian, or democratic, social rela-
tions across class lines’ (Knight 2005, p. 182). In practice, Hull House offered 
a comprehensive set of social services and cultural, recreational and educa-
tional activities for people who could hardly be more different from the peo-
ple with whom Addams herself grew up (Boisvert and Heldke 2016, p. 63).
The limitations of reciprocity
Sociology and anthropology have focussed more on describing the practical 
forms of reciprocity and solidarity that appear in communal life than on 
their ethical requirements or content in an ideal world. It is comforting to 
note that in practice, people do not always think only of their immediate 
benefits. Empathy, generosity and offering, in other words reciprocity, are 
found in every society – even in modern society, where it is feared that the 
individual, in pursuit of personal gain, will trample others under foot in an 
atmosphere of heightened individualism.
Nonetheless, according to Marcel Mauss (1999), a gift is not given without 
an expectation that the giver will receive a gift in return. We compete even 
in munificence; even a debt of gratitude is a debt. In the closest human rela-
tionships, interaction can still be directed by altruistic benevolence in which 
help is given, even at the expense of the well-being of the helper. Outside such 
relationships, a precondition for giving is nevertheless that it is  worthwhile 
or cost-effective. Expressed in plain technical terms, helping is worthwhile 
if the cost is ‘smaller than the benefit of the expected return service times the 
probability of receiving that service’ (Danielsbacka 2013, p. 31).
According to evolutionary psychologists, the desire to help is genetically 
encoded within us, but it is more likely to be directed towards those who are 
close to us. How far the circle of empathy extends in practice is dependent 
on the cultural environment (Pinker 2011, p. 668, Danielsbacka 2013, p. 30). 
It usually includes family members, who receive help almost uncondition-
ally. In contrast, helping friends is already bound up with the quality of 
each individual relationship and the general norms that govern friendships. 
Altruistic giving is, after all, the exception, but so is the exclusive pursuit 
of personal gain; most commonly, we operate between these two extremes 
(Kolm 2000b, p. 115).
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Nowhere does the circle of empathy extend limitlessly. It covers ‘us’ but 
not ‘them’ or ‘others’. It is no wonder that Sennett (1999, pp. 136–139) con-
siders the pronoun ‘we’ to be so dangerous. By cultivating it, we strengthen 
our circles of empathy and build their internal senses of community, but the 
word ‘us’ is also swiftly repeated when excluding ‘others’. If empathy and 
reciprocity are genetically programmed, then so is the binary opposition of 
‘us’ and ‘them’, and this opposition can be reproduced in the name of ‘us’.
When discussing ‘the corrosion of character’, Sennett (1999) claims that 
reciprocity is weakened by societal changes. Under the conditions of new 
neoliberal capitalism, people are forced to adopt an individualistic ‘flexibil-
ity’, and reciprocal loyalty is no longer the self-evident foundation of com-
munal life. According to Sennett, a character that is incapable of empathy 
will become more common. This has also been discussed by Christopher 
Lasch (1979) in his analysis of the culture of narcissism and was detailed dec-
ades before by Georg Simmel (1903/2005, pp. 33–36) in his description of the 
reserved habitus of people raised in modern urban society. In the metrop-
olis, it is simply impossible to encounter others as whole personalities. One 
cannot look them in the face, cannot become involved in all their possible 
woes and troubles – not without finding oneself in a ‘completely unbearable 
spiritual state’, at least (ibid., p. 35). We learn to pass others by.
The dominant form of solidarity in modern society is said to be negative 
solidarity, which is demonstrated by not interfering in the business of others 
(Kortteinen 1982, pp. 251–252). That, too, is solidarity, and a certain form 
of reciprocity, as we do not expect others to interfere in our affairs either. 
Although non-interference and the reciprocal guarding of each other’s pri-
vacy are a necessity of sorts and sometimes even an indication of tact, none-
theless, they should not be turned into a virtue. On the contrary, negative 
solidarity easily leads us to view ‘others’ as simply not being there at all: We 
do not harm them, but nor do we respect them; they are simply ignored. 
Those on the fringes, or outside, of the circle of empathy go unnoticed and 
are easily abandoned. Simmel was conscious of this when writing about how 
aloofness or indifference towards others – which he also considered to be a 
guarantee of personal freedom – can, in an instant, ‘break into hatred and 
fight’ (Simmel 2005, p. 35). Buber crystallises the relationship between posi-
tive and negative solidarity by stating that a person must live in the world of 
It but ‘he who lives with It alone is not a man’ (Buber 1999, p. 34).
Welfare state reciprocity
In recent times, increasing calls have been made for people to take greater 
care of one another rather than leaving this care to the welfare state. It is 
nevertheless unrealistic to imagine that in families and local communi-
ties, entirely untapped reciprocal resources lie dormant, as is claimed by 
those supporting individual solutions or advocating for ‘implicit famili-
alism’ (Leitner 2003). Because the circle of moral responsibility does not 
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necessarily extend very far, not everything can rest on individual behaviour. 
If we cannot look ‘others’ in the face, their needs can be addressed through 
social policy and social work. Reciprocity that produces well-being is not 
only interaction between individuals; rather, social life and social policy are 
‘fundamentally a question of reciprocity’ (Kolm 2000a, p. 16, Bruni 2008, 
pp. ix–xii).
Richard Titmuss’s (1970) famous example of general or indirect reciprocity 
was that of giving blood. Blood donors do not expect payment or any other 
immediate gift in return. They do not even know who will receive the blood 
they have donated – just as they do not know the purpose for which their 
individual tax payments will be used. Blood donors and taxpayers simply 
trust that reciprocity will occur: Tax revenue will also be used for their ben-
efit, and they will be given blood if they happen to need it.
jyri Liukko, a Finnish researcher of social policy, has dubbed social in-
surance to be a ‘solidarity machine’. Social insurance is a moral technology 
that makes solidarity automatic, and which ‘is always in some way linked 
to collaborative action and reciprocity’ (Liukko 2013, p. 8). Similarly, the 
entire welfare state can be considered an institution that is based on and 
realises general reciprocity.
General reciprocity, however, is not symmetrical in the same way as 
genuine reciprocity between individuals might be. One does not receive 
services and income transfers that are directly equated to one’s tax con-
tributions. Means testing results in help being given to those who need it 
the most. Social support differs from true reciprocity in terms of its redis-
tributive  nature, but it can also be understood as ‘delayed reciprocity’ or 
as investment. In the long run, society enjoys a return on its investment, 
and the public good  accumulates. Social investments nevertheless require 
time; the return may be long in coming, and sometimes, there is no payback 
for the help  provided. For this reason, too, the public sector is better suited 
to making social investments and engaging in general reciprocity than are 
private  actors (Sipilä 2011, p. 363).
Reciprocity in old age and in intergenerational relationships
In general, there is no need to understand reciprocity solely as one giving 
something to another, who, in turn, gives something of equal worth in re-
turn. For example, intergenerational reciprocity is often based on ‘chains’: 
A gives to B and B, in turn, gives to C (Kolm 2000a, p. 7, Kolm 2008, 
pp. 16, 46 and 79). The older generation pays for the younger generation’s 
schooling, and the latter pays for the education of the next. An example of 
a chain in the other direction, and of general reciprocity, is pension pol-
icy. In  pay-as-you-go pension systems, the lion’s share of workers’ pension 
contributions is used to pay the pensions of those already retired, and the 
workers must trust that this practice will continue in the future, when they 
too have retired.
Reciprocity and well-being 21
Taking care of one’s own children is a universally internalised obligation. 
In many countries, the interests of children are also enshrined in law, and 
if parents seriously neglect these interests, then their parenthood can be 
limited. In contrast, in Finland, there are no statutory obligations to care 
for one’s parents, but, of course, there are normative obligations. From the 
perspective of their well-being, it is important that the elderly receive the 
care they need and can also otherwise interact with members of the younger 
generation. Intergenerational social intercourse is important to the elderly 
(Bengtson 2001), but young people also desire it, at the latest when they be-
come old themselves and want to maintain contact with their own children 
and grandchildren.
For elderly people, reciprocity is a particularly central source of well- 
being; without it, it is futile to speak of successful ageing. Elderly people 
typically expect that others will have the time for social intercourse, and 
this concerns both intimate relationships and professional care. Of course, 
a professional carer also gains a sense of pleasure from having the time to 
properly encounter others as whole human beings rather than as the latest 
home help customers of the day. However, for professional carers, time is 
often short. Care work is organised in the same way as other forms of pro-
duction, and this prevents the deepening of reciprocity. A conflict arises 
between ‘doing and encountering’ (Palomäki and Toikko 2007).
In spite of its apparent asymmetry, care is also essentially reciprocal. Care 
is about concern for others and taking responsibility, looking after others 
and carrying their cares (Fisher and Tronto 1990). It is a relational activity, 
based on mutual dependency (Martela 2012), whose telos is restoring the 
autonomy of the care receiver (De Lange 2011). Care requires reciprocal 
tact, adapting oneself to the pace and rhythm of the other (see Naukkarinen 
2011). For example, in family care, the reciprocal functions of the provider 
and the recipient of care complement each other so subtly that it is some-
times impossible to distinguish the role of the carer from that of the recip-
ient (Andersson 2007). Nevertheless, there is often a divide between these 
roles; for example, someone suffering from severe dementia can be entirely 
at the mercy of others. The abilities to engage in reciprocity and accept re-
sponsibility are particularly tested when the other person no longer seems to 
be an autonomous agent nor appears capable of giving anything.
Bryan S. Turner (1989, Pilcher 1995, p. 105) sees the precarious social 
 status of the elderly as resulting from their often being solely recipients of 
care and help when their abilities to give and to engage in immediate reci-
procity have diminished. This can be fateful in a society where ‘the ideology 
of social parasitism’ prevails, and helplessness is a sign of weakness and 
dependence on others a mark of shame (Sennett 1999, p. 139–140). When we 
have started to measure the ‘success’ of old age against the ideal of produc-
tive ageing, in which the greatest value is given to work and work-like activi-
ties, we no longer understand that those who have become helpless and unfit 
for work also have, and particularly have had, something to give.
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jari Pirhonen (2015), who has adapted Charles Taylor’s (1992) and Axel 
Honneth’s (2005) recognition theory to eldercare in Finland, is concerned 
that the humanity of incapacitated elderly people will be lost in their 
 ‘patienthood’ or ‘customership’. Indeed, this will happen if the elderly are 
seen merely as clients, patients or medical cases rather than as whole human 
beings and unique biographical creatures. A new kind of professionalism, 
informed by theories of reciprocity and well-being, is also needed in elder-
care. This professionalism is ‘generationally intelligent’ (Biggs and Lowen-
stein 2011) when it is sensitive to the life-courses and lifeworlds of ‘clients’ 
who belong to different generations than their carers.
Our thinking about old age is far too polarised, placed either in a frame-
work of choices or a framework of necessities. Incapacity and dependence on 
others seem completely incompatible with activeness and autonomy, which 
are nowadays so strongly emphasised (Kröger et al. 2007, pp. 11–13). In old 
age, agency and activeness are important, but they are often understood 
only narrowly, through rationalistic choices and in terms of productive 
activities (Grenier and Phillipson 2013). Referring to Alasdair MacIntyre 
(1999, pp. 1–9), Pirhonen (2015) writes that
humanity is not defined by rationality and self-determination, but by 
biology, frailty and dependence. We are born completely dependent, we 
create the illusion of self-determination during our adulthood and we 
are forced to recognise our dependence once more as our capacity de-
clines with aging.
Simon Biggs and Ariela Lowenstein (2011) call for generational intelligence, 
a form of reflexive reciprocity, in both private and public life. They advocate 
that our perspectives should not be defined simply by the typical aims of 
our own age groups and generations and our own immediate benefits and 
desires. We should remember the existence of other generations and under-
stand that they too have legitimate interests, which are balanced with our 
own in social policies.
It is particularly difficult for us to empathise with those generations yet to 
be born. Nevertheless, we must do this (Kolm 2000a, p. 29) as it is a require-
ment of the social sustainability of well-being. The state of the world should 
be at least as good when we leave it as when we were born into it (Becker 
1986, p. 228). We must also offer something to future generations, and we 
cannot ask them to pick up our tab just because they won’t have a chance to 
buy us a round.
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